俄乌冲突战况评估，12月12日

本文翻译自战争研究所

俄罗斯军队正在继续调整和巩固其在乌克兰东部的部队构成，以加强防御乌克兰在 Kharkiv-Luhansk 边境附近正在进行的反攻，并支持在 Donetsk Oblast 的有限进攻努力。一个独立的乌克兰分析组织，国防战略中心，在12月12日指出，俄罗斯正在集中和系统化的指挥和控制西部军区(大规模杀伤性武器)部队在 Kharkiv-Luhansk 方向。该中心注意到，大规模杀伤性武器的第20联合武装部队目前正在这一地区作战，分为三大类: 斯瓦托韦附近的第144摩托化步枪师、 Kreminna-Rubizhne 线上的第3摩托化步枪师和 Luhansk Oblast 西北部靠近 Troitske 的第11陆军第18摩托化步枪师。该中心还报告说，美国陆军第1和第2兵团(分别为顿涅茨克和 Luhansk People’s Republics 部队)、第76空中突击师和第106空降师，以及多达3个巴尔斯(战斗预备役)分队的15至17个营集中在这一大区。[3]这些部队的集中程度可能明显下降，兵力不足。

在9月份乌克兰发动全面反攻之前，国际妇女观察社曾观察到大规模毁灭性武器分子在整个哈尔科夫州活动，最终将俄罗斯部队赶回了哈尔科夫-卢甘斯克州边界的现有防线。[4]俄罗斯和乌克兰的报告进一步表明，在这一轴线上活动的动员人员高度集中，可能是为了填补乌克兰在乌克兰东北部进行反攻过程中已经退化的大规模毁灭性武器部队的空白。巴尔斯 -13和巴尔斯 -16分遣队在 Svatove-Kreminna 沿线特别活跃。以前在 Severodonetsk-Lysychansk 地区观察到过中央军区的一些部分。俄罗斯空降部队(VDV)在 Luhansk Oblast 活动的情况表明，他们已经从克尔森州西岸(右岸)重新部署。 ISW 此前曾报告称，在俄罗斯从克尔森州右岸大规模撤军之前，他们正在那里活动。目前驻扎在赫尔松东部的俄罗斯特遣队的组成尚不清楚。俄罗斯南部军区(sMD)可能在被占领的赫尔松和 Zaporizhia Oblasts 保持存在。[9]

瓦格纳集团战斗机在第一和第二陆军部队的支持下，主要负责推动在 Donetsk Oblast 的进攻行动，特别是在巴赫穆特河和 Donetsk City 西郊。ISW 此前曾报告过瓦格纳集团军队在过去几个月确保巴赫穆特河周边地区取得微小进展的作用。Luhansk People’s Republic 陆军第二兵团第6团的部队已经在巴赫穆特河东北部的 Soledar 地区活动。ISW 还观察到 Donetsk People’s Republic 第一陆军部队(DNR)在 Donetsk City-Avdiivka 地区的集结，特别是“斯巴达”和“索马里”营，它们已经在 Donetsk City 西郊的 Pisky、沃迪安和马林卡等地区取得了进展。自2014年以来，DNR 元素在这一领域显著活跃。俄罗斯消息来源报道，DNR 部队、俄罗斯东部军区(EMD)的成员、太平洋舰队第155海军步兵旅和第40独立海军步兵旅负责11月在 Donetsk City 西南部的 Vuhledar-Pavlivka 地区进行代价高昂的进攻行动。[12]

俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争成本可能会继续削弱俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)在世界各地的地缘政治活动。英国国防部(MoD)12月11日报道，普京签署了一项法律，为2023年预算拨款超过9万亿卢布(约合1430亿美元)用于国防、安全和执法。根据世界银行的数据，这个数字大约是俄罗斯2021年国内生产总值的8% 。[13]英国国防部估计，俄罗斯的国防开支显著增加，将占俄罗斯2023年全部预算的30% 以上。[14]因此，普京正在继续把他的预算用于乌克兰战争，并可能需要在此过程中取消其他国际或国内战役的资金。ISW 长期以来一直认为，俄罗斯军队一直在从叙利亚和纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫等其他冲突地区转移装备和人员，并可能放弃其他战斗和软实力活动，转而支持在乌克兰持续打持久战。[15]

然而，普京似乎仍不愿在短期内牺牲自己的地缘政治举措，而且面临着财政困境的风险，在这种困境中，他将无法在乌克兰的最高目标与他的全球力量投射运动之间找到平衡。例如，普京继续试图重建俄罗斯在中亚的地位，他曾在去年11月下旬提议在俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦之间建立一个三边联盟，并在12月9日于比什凯克召开的欧亚经济最高理事会会议上提出了这一建议，但均以失败告终。[16]普京对地区软实力的持续投入已经让一些著名的支持战争的军事博客作者感到不安，他们批评克里姆林宫据报道拨款近60亿卢布(约合9550万美元)在塔吉克斯坦发展俄语学校，却未能为战场上的俄罗斯军队提供经费。[17]这些微博用户补充说，克里姆林宫没有有效地利用其在塔吉克斯坦的软实力，这进一步使人们对这种支出的必要性产生了怀疑。

俄罗斯国防部(MoD)正式否认了俄罗斯总参谋长瓦列里 · 格拉西莫夫(Valery Gerasimov)已经或即将被取代的传言，尽管它没有提供可信的支持来证明国防部长谢尔盖 · 绍伊古(Sergei Shoigu)仍然在职。12月11日，一家著名的俄罗斯媒体聚合网站散布了一则消息，称格拉西莫夫可能很快就会被取代。[18]据报道，这种说法来自身份不明的俄罗斯微博用户，一些俄罗斯消息来源要么放大了这种说法，要么警告他们的听众不要参与这种谣言。[19]俄罗斯国防部直接否认了杰拉西莫夫的辞职或接替，称这些说法是乌克兰的“假”，并提供了一些图片链接，据称这些图片显示杰拉西莫夫在过去几周内执行公务。[20]正如 ISW 在7月份报道的那样，俄罗斯国防部此前曾对有关杰拉西莫夫辞职或被替换的报道表现出类似的敏感性，并直接回应驳斥了这种说法。[21]这种证明格拉西莫夫仍然担任总参谋长的共同努力表明，俄罗斯国防部正试图将俄罗斯军方领导人描述为现任并参与俄罗斯军事事务，并抵消有关乌克兰普遍失败导致俄罗斯指挥结构大规模中断和不一致的报道。[22]尽管俄罗斯国防部显然有意维护格拉西莫夫的声誉，但该部未能提供有关他的活动的视频证据。该部一直与俄罗斯国防部长谢尔盖 · 绍伊古(Sergei Shoigu)合作，应该能够轻易地为总参谋长提供视频证据。[23]

乌克兰国防部长雷兹尼科夫表示，乌克兰打算在2022年至2023年冬季继续反攻，此前乌克兰的硬冻结使战前机动得以实施，这支持了国际战略武器组织的评估。[24]12月11日，雷兹尼科夫在回答有关美国国家情报总监(DNI)艾薇儿 · 海恩斯(Avril Haines)预测乌克兰可能在春季而非冬季发动反攻的问题时表示，在冬季“局势更加稳固”之后，乌克兰将恢复反攻。[25]雷兹尼科夫此前在12月6日表示，乌克兰需要大炮弹药、装甲车、坦克和战斗机来支持乌克兰的反攻。[26]

美国政府高级官员可能正在纠正他们对乌克兰今冬进行反攻行动的能力和意图的评估。美国之音国家安全记者杰夫 · 塞尔丁报道说，一位不愿透露姓名的美国高级军事官员在12月12日表示，“我们知道乌克兰人能够在这样的(冬天)条件下很好地战斗”。[27]国家情报局长海恩斯此前错误地将乌克兰进行更多反攻的最佳时机窗口定为春季，而不是12月3日的冬季。[28]国际社会工作组以前评估认为，乌克兰可能寻求在2022-2023年冬季期间连续开展行动。[29]

英国国防部评估称，俄罗斯可能仍打算保留对其所有被占领乌克兰领土的控制权，这支持了 ISW 最近的评估，即克里姆林宫可能在乌克兰维持其最高目标。[30]根据英国国防部的评估，俄罗斯军方领导层仍打算在顿涅茨克州取得更多进展，但俄罗斯目前的军事战略极不可能让莫斯科实现这一目标。ISW 此前评估，克里姆林宫发言人德米特里•佩斯科夫(Dmitry Peskov)12月8日的声明将俄罗斯的领土目标定义为控制整个顿涅茨克、 Luhansk、赫尔松和 Zaporizhia，但鉴于他重申了普京2月24日提出的乌克兰“非军事化”和“非纳粹化”的目标，这将抑制乌克兰抵抗俄罗斯未来军事或颠覆活动的能力，他的声明仍然是最高纲领。[32]

外卖钥匙

• 俄罗斯军队正在继续调整和巩固其在乌克兰东部的部队构成，以加强防御乌克兰在 Kharkiv-Luhansk 边境附近正在进行的反攻，并支持在 Donetsk Oblast 的有限进攻努力。
• The cost of the Russian war in Ukraine will likely continue to undermine Russian President Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical campaigns worldwide.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially denied rumors that Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov has been or soon will be replaced, although it stopped short of offering the kind of credible support for this denial that it has provided that Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu is still on the job.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated that Ukraine intends to continue counteroffensives in winter 2022–2023 after the hard freeze enables maneuver warfare, supporting an ISW assessment.
• Senior US government officials may be correcting their assessments about Ukraine’s ability and intent to conduct counteroffensive operations this winter.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna as Ukrainian forces struck rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka–Donetsk City areas and conducted defensive operations southwest of Donetsk City.
• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets and logistics hubs along critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces are fortifying the northern beaches of Crimea along the Black Sea coast.
• Russian forces may lack sufficient infrastructure to support their troops in Crimea.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Svatove in order to regain lost positions on December 11 and 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks 15km west of Svatove near Andriivka and 15km northwest of Svatove near Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka between December 11 and 12.[33] Geolocated footage posted on December 11 and 12 shows a Ukrainian tank destroying a Russian tank from positions in the western part of Novoselivske, suggesting that Ukrainian troops maintain control of part of the settlement despite previous Russian claims that Russian troops had taken full control in the prior weeks.[34] A Russian source posted footage of Russian troops launching TOS-1A thermobaric rockets from positions near Kuzemivka, 11km northwest of Svatove.[35] Geolocated footage posted on December 10 additionally shows a Russian heavy equipment transport truck carrying a T-90M battle tank just north of Luhansk City, about 118km southeast of Svatove.[36] This footage is consistent with previous reports that Russian troops are using Luhansk City as a transportation hub for equipment destined for the Svatove-Kreminna front.[37]

Russian forces continued limited offensive actions to regain lost positions west of Kreminna on December 11 and 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful attacks near Chervonopopivka and Zhytlivka (both within 5km north of Kreminna), Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka and Serebrianka (both about 10km south of Kreminna).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Kreminna front, especially along the Makiivka-Kreminna line, is the most difficult axis of advance in Ukraine with the exception of Bakhmut.[39] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops have been losing ground around Kreminna and that Russian troops have made significant gains west of the R66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway between December 11 and 12, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[40] Russian sources widely reported that the most intense fighting is occurring northwest of Kreminna, particularly in the Chervonopopivka-Zhytlivka-Ploshchanka pocket.[41]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian concentration areas in the rear of Luhansk Oblast on December 11 and 12. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on December 11 that Ukrainian troops struck a hotel in Kadiivka (60km southeast of Kreminna) where Wagner Group fighters were reportedly staying.[42] Haidai noted that Wagner forces suffered high losses as a result of the strike.[43] Ukrainian strikes also targeted Russian forces in a hostel in Svatove, causing extensive damage to the building.[44]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on December 11 and 12. An unnamed US military official stated that Wagner Group and Russian forces are engaged in intense battles for Bakhmut and committing significant resources to maintain the pace but noted that Ukrainian forces “continue to hold the line.”[45] Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces have changed their tactical force composition in the Bakhmut direction by switching from using company and battalion tactical groups (BTGs) to using assault units to perform purely offensive tasks.[46]  The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut and settlements northeast of the city in Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamianske, Soledar, Bakhmutske, and Pidhorodne, on December 11 and 12.[47] Russian sources claimed that Wagner forces stormed Pidhorodne to partially encircle Bakhmut on December 12.[48] Geolocated footage showed a destroyed railway bridge over the E40 (M-03) highway northwest of Pidhorone, which Russian sources claimed to be one of two remaining main ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Bakhmut.[49] Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces blew up the bridge to create an artificial barricade on the E40 towards Slovyansk.[50] A Russian source also claimed that Wagner assault detachments established control over two former Ukrainian platoon positions on the Bakhmut-Soledar line approaching a highway connecting the settlements, likely referring to the T1302 highway.[51] Russian sources also claimed that Wagner Group forces advanced near Opytne (3km south of Bakhmut) and that fighting is ongoing in the area.[52] A Russian source claimed that Wagner Group forces launched attacks from the Andriivka area (9km southwest of Bakhmut) against unspecified settlements and claimed that fighting is ongoing east of Bakhmut, noting that Ukrainian forces are not retreating from the city.[53]Another Russian source claimed that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces are attempting to advance east towards Toretsk (23km southwest of Bakhmut) with artillery support.[54]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area on December 11 and 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Krasnohorivka (19km west of Donetsk City), Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (about 25km southwest of Donetsk City) on December 12.[55] DNR Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces control 70% of Marinka on December 12.[56] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces failed to break through Ukrainian defenses along Druzhba Street in the center of Marinka but that fighting is ongoing.[57] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to regain control of Pisky (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and that Russian forces thwarted a Ukrainian counterattack in the area on December 12.[58]  Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances toward Pervomaiske and Vodyane on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on December 11 and 12.[59] ISW is unable to confirm the veracity of the milbloggers’ or Pushilin’s claims.

Russian forces conducted defensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on December 11 and 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 11 that Russian forces are defending their positions near Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka (31km northwest of Vuhledar), Zolota Nyva (19km northwest of Vuhledar), and Pavlivka (3km southwest of Vuhledar).[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances towards Velyka Novosilka on December 11 and 12.[61] Russian sources boasted about a Ukrainian retreat in this area while a Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian defenses halted a Russian advance.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 11 that Russian forces massed as if preparing for a full ground attack but only conducted reconnaissance-in-force near Velyka Novosilka and claimed such an act indicates poor readiness.[63] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attempt to advance towards Neskuchne (33km west of Vuhledar) on December 11.[64] Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on December 11 and 12.[65]

支援工作ーー南轴(俄罗斯目标: 保持前线阵地，确保后方地区不受乌克兰袭击)

在12月11日和12日恶劣的天气条件下，俄罗斯军队继续加强在 Kherson Oblast 的防御阵地。乌克兰南方作战指挥部表示，Kherson Oblast 有大雾，能见度低，道路结冰，导致道路交通困难。乌克兰塔夫里亚国防军集团发言人叶夫尼 · 耶林(Yevheny Yerin)表示，俄罗斯军队正在赫尔松方向重新部署部队，加强防线，并开展破坏和侦察行动。叶林表示，俄罗斯军队的目标是在 Kherson City 西南的第尼普罗河三角洲的岛屿上建立观察哨。乌克兰和俄罗斯的消息来源称，俄罗斯军队在12月11日和12日继续炮击第尼普罗河西岸(右岸)的地区，包括 Kherson City 及其周边地区。[69]

乌克兰军队继续在乌克兰南部的关键地面通信线路(GLOCs)沿线打击俄罗斯军事资产和后勤中心。地理定位的镜头显示了12月10日至11日晚间在 Zaporizhia Oblast 首都 Melitopol 发生的一起针对餐馆酒店的袭击事件的后果。 Melitopol 市长伊万 · 费多罗夫(Ivan Fedorov)表示，俄罗斯军队将这里作为联邦安全局(fSB)的基地，并对士兵进行训练。费多罗夫还表示，乌克兰军队袭击了俄罗斯在 Bohdanivka 的一个检查站和后勤中心，在塞梅尼夫卡的一个雷达站，都在 Melitopol 东北部，以及俄罗斯在波洛希和 Maiske 的两个军事基地。[71]费多罗夫补充说，这些袭击共造成数十名俄罗斯军人死亡，200多名军人受伤。乌克兰 Zaporizhia 州军事管理局12月11日表示，乌克兰在 Zaporizhia Oblast 一个未指明区域的袭击造成150多名俄罗斯军事人员受伤。俄罗斯和乌克兰的消息来源报道，乌克兰军队在12月11日和12日袭击了 Kherson Oblast 第聂普罗河东岸(左)地区，包括奥莱什基和霍拉普里斯坦，以及 Kherson Oblast 东部的后方地区，包括斯卡多夫斯克、 Chaplynka 和 Radensk。[74]

Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts on December 11 and 12.[75] Russian forces struck Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast on December 11 and 12.[76] Russian sources expressed continued concern that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a counteroffensive along the Zaporizhia Oblast front line.[77]

Russian forces are fortifying the northern beaches of Crimea along the Black Sea coast. An image posted on December 10 shows that Russian forces are digging trenches along a beach in Chornomorske, Crimea (124km south of Kherson City).[78] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities in Crimea are strengthening law enforcement and counterintelligence measures in Chornomorske and Mizhvodne, both along the northwestern beachline and the T0107 highway that connects northwestern coastal areas of Crimea to Simferopol and other rear areas.[79] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that pictures of these fortifications are instead part of an effort to restore Crimean beaches for tourism, but it remains unclear how digging trenchlike fortifications would assist such restoration efforts.[80] Russian forces may be concerned about a possible future Ukrainian amphibious counteroffensive against Crimea from across the Black Sea.

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces are lacking sufficient infrastructure to support their troops in Crimea. Russian milbloggers claimed that the 1472nd Naval Clinical Hospital in Sevastopol is facing blood donor supply shortages for wounded Russian personnel.[81] The milbloggers claimed that the hospital staff notified the Russian military command of lacking commercially provided supplies for blood collection but had not received any support in rectifying the problem. The milbloggers stated that the main cause of the shortage of supplies is the hospitals’ lack of budgetary provisions for blood-transfusion-related materials in 2022 and implied that corruption is at play. Russian forces are also likely experiencing supply shortages as a result of the damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge. Russian President Vladimir Putin noted on December 9 that he expects Russia to repair the road bridge in March and railway lines in mid-summer, which is likely going to continue to challenge Russia’s ability to supply forces.[82]

俄罗斯“西罗维基”组织(siloviki)是拥有准军事机构的俄罗斯精英团体的成员，该组织正在继续招募人员加入其部队。俄罗斯反对派媒体美杜莎采访了来自印古什的军人和位于格罗兹尼的俄罗斯特种部队大学的雇员，车臣共和国暗示车臣领导人拉姆赞 · 卡德罗夫正在从 Inhushetia 招募志愿者以换取政治上的好处。梅杜萨的报告指出，卡德罗夫支持 Inhushetia 的苏菲兄弟会(Sufi brotherhood) ，以换取部署到乌克兰的志愿者。自2010年代初以来，苏菲兄弟会在该地区的支持率一直在下降。SPETSNAZ 大学的工作人员说，车臣已经部署了大约10,000名来自该大学的志愿人员，这些志愿人员只经过了两个星期的培训，Kadyrov 继续不断地宣传部署了志愿人员单位。[84]库尔斯克州州长 Roman Starovoit 还宣布，库尔斯克地区防卫队，即“爱国者人民小队”计划招募6000人。ISW 此前曾报道，瓦格纳集团的金融家叶夫根尼 · 普里戈津(Yevgeny Prigozhin)曾发表评论，暗示他与别尔哥罗德和库尔斯克州新宣布的领土防御部队有联系。[86]

乌克兰官员日益警告称，俄罗斯武装部队正在被占领的 Luhansk 和 Zaporizhia 各州加强强制动员行动，预计俄罗斯将出现第二波动员。乌克兰抵抗中心指出，在定于2023年1月至2月进行的新一轮俄罗斯动员之前，俄罗斯部队正在搜寻并向乌克兰男子发出传票。乌克兰总参谋部报告说，俄罗斯军队正在大力动员乌克兰男子，以补充在 Severodonetsk 方向活动的人员，并对居住在顿涅茨克-卢甘斯克州行政边界的 Khrystalnyi 男子实施严格的行动限制。流亡的乌克兰地方官员报告说，俄罗斯军队也在 Dovzhansk、 Luhansk (靠近俄罗斯边境)和 Melitopol、 Zaporizhia Oblast 强力调动人员。[89]乌克兰官员没有具体说明俄罗斯部队是否以及将在哪里训练这些动员起来的部队，马里乌波尔市长的顾问彼得罗 · 安德留申科(Petro Andryushenko)指出，俄罗斯部队在马里乌波尔郊区为动员起来的俄罗斯人建立了第二个训练营。[90]

克里姆林宫仍在努力解决向动员起来的人员支付款项的问题，并试图转移俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔 · 普京对延迟支付款项的指责。克里姆林宫通过了向被动员和签约军人一次性支付19.5万卢布(约合3100美元)的规定。[91]如果俄罗斯军人的配偶在国外开立金融账户，资助企业活动，或者军人犯罪，他们将需要退还这笔一次性付款。这些规则还要求军人在违反与俄罗斯武装部队的合同时退还部分付款。俄罗斯官员可能会继续努力提供这些一次性付款，这些款项超过俄罗斯正常工资的两倍，是预防军人及其亲属发生进一步抗议的努力的一部分。Zaporizhia 州占领区管理委员会成员 Vladimir Rogov 表示，如果被动员的人没有收到一次性付款，他们不应该联系俄罗斯总统 Vladimir Putin 或者俄罗斯国防部，而应该向他们的指挥官投诉。[92]罗戈夫的要求很可能是为了转移俄罗斯领导层的指责，因为俄罗斯领导层实际上有权批准这些付款。

然而，俄罗斯动员起来的士兵和他们的教官继续描述缺乏设备和物资的问题。来自 Stavropol 的第247空中突击团的一名战斗训练教官和他动员起来的下属发布了一段视频呼吁，抱怨训练中心缺少衣服和物资，以及不卫生的条件。[93]一些俄罗斯的军事博客同意这一呼吁，指出应该由联邦而不是地方当局负责动员人员的适当装备。俄罗斯人权项目 Gulagu.net 的创始人弗拉基米尔 · 奥塞奇金(Vladimir Osechkin)还发表了一段监狱当局殴打 Kaluga Oblast 囚犯的视频，视频中囚犯拒绝与瓦格纳作战，这表明俄罗斯的准军事机构也没有妥善对待他们的部队。[95]

在俄罗斯占领区的活动(俄罗斯的目标: 巩固对被吞并地区的行政控制; 强行将乌克兰平民纳入俄罗斯的社会文化、经济、军事和治理体系)

俄罗斯占领当局正在继续努力对被占领土上的乌克兰公民建立法律控制。卢甘斯克州州长 Serhiy Haidai 在12月12日表示，在自称的 Luhansk People’s Republic，官员们正在逐步用俄罗斯公民填补该地区的执法空缺。12月12日，乌克兰战略通信和信息安全中心报告称，俄罗斯占领军官员目前关押在被占领的 Zaporizhia Oblast 的230多名乌克兰公民，以迫使他们与俄罗斯占领军合作。12月11日，乌克兰总参谋部报告称，俄罗斯占领当局继续强迫乌克兰公民在被占领土上获得俄罗斯护照，尤其是在 Zaporizhia Oblast 的 Melitopol。[98]

俄罗斯占领当局继续采取措施巩固对被占领土的经济控制，并迫使乌克兰平民在12月11日和12日改用卢布。据乌克兰抵抗中心报道，俄罗斯占领当局允许乌克兰人选择将本国货币兑换成1卢布兑换1.25格里夫尼亚，这与官方规定的1卢布兑换1.59格里夫尼亚的汇率不符。[99]乌克兰抵抗中心12月12日报道，俄罗斯占领当局继续敦促乌克兰企业消灭格里夫纳，但尽管面临罚款和威胁，仍面临阻力。[100]乌克兰总参谋部12月11日报告说，俄罗斯占领当局向达到退休年龄的人提供1万卢布的财政援助，并向同意在占领当局机构工作的当地人提供更高的工资。[101]乌克兰总参谋部12月11日还报告说，俄罗斯占领当局正在逐步将乌克兰格里夫尼亚从贸易网络中撤出，迫使民众转而使用俄罗斯卢布。[102]

俄罗斯占领当局继续以被占领土上的乌克兰儿童为目标，进行宣传，为俄罗斯入侵乌克兰辩护。12月12日，乌克兰抵抗中心表示，被占领土上的学校雇佣了俄罗斯教师，用俄罗斯从“纳粹”手中解放乌克兰儿童的故事给他们洗脑[103]乌克兰抵抗中心12月12日还报告说，俄罗斯占领当局在乌克兰南部增加了招待俄罗斯著名博客作者、运动员和音乐家的宣传活动。[104]

俄罗斯占领当局在被占领土上继续面临党派压力。乌克兰和鞑靼游击队“阿特什”声称对12月10日在 Sovietske 的俄罗斯军营纵火事件负责，并指出他们的目标只是动员起来的俄罗斯士兵基地。[105]